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Abstract 
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of mandatory regulatory 
provisions on board structure and the influence of such board structure on institutional 
holdings.  
Design/Methodology/Approach - The study uses unique hand-collected data set of Indian 
IPOs during the 2004-2012 period after the corporate governance reforms with the introduction 
of Clause 49 in the listing agreements in 2001. Using OLS regression, the paper empirically 
analyses the determinants of board size and board independence at the time of the IPOs and the 
influence of such a board structure on shareholdings by domestic and foreign institutional 
investors. 
Findings - The authors find that complying with mandatory regulatory provisions does not 
impede firms from structuring their boards to reflect the firms’ advising and monitoring needs. 
The authors also find that complying with provisions have positive implication for the firm, as 
firms with greater board independence appear to attract more foreign institutional investors.   
Originality/Value - To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study to examine the issue 
in a regime where regulation mandates the composition of the board of directors. The paper 
also extends the literature on institutional holdings by providing evidence on the impact of 
board structure on institutional ownership at a critical time in a firm’s life cycle when concerns 
for endogeneity for empirical investigations are weaker. 
Keywords: Board size, Board independence, Institutional investors, Foreign institutional 
investors, Indian IPOs 
Paper type: Research Paper  
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of major corporate collapses, new legislations and governance codes have emerged 
around the world and private firms contemplating undertaking public listing are required to 
meet a number of regulatory requirements. One such regulatory requirement relates to the 
structure of the board of directors where mandatory provisions have been put in place in a 
number of countries including the U.S. While there is extensive research on the relation 
between corporate governance and a firm’s financial performance, we still know very little on 
how firms structure their boards at the time of an initial public offer (IPO). This is particularly 
true in the context where mandatory regulatory provisions are in place. In this study, we look 
at two related issues that explore mandatory corporate governance regulations in the context of 
IPO firms. First, we ask whether mandatory regulations impede firms in structuring their boards 
at the time of the IPO. We follow this by examining the implication of such mandatory 
regulations on firm outcomes.              
We analyze these two issues by using data from Indian IPO firms issued during the 2004-2012 
period. The paper addresses the first issue by examining the impact of mandatory regulation 
on two fronts of board structure of Indian firms at the time of IPO: (i) board size and (ii) board 
independence. The period of our study marks an important era of corporate governance reforms 
in India with the introduction of Clause 49 in the listing agreements in 2001. The clause 
specifies mandatory provisions on board independence with the fraction of independent 
directors conditional on whether the chairman of the board is also the CEO or founder 
(promoter) of the firm [1]. Such regulatory requirements provide us with an ideal setting to 
examine whether such mandatory regulations assists or impedes firms in structuring their 
boards at the time of IPO.   
We address the second issue by investigating an important outcome associated with IPO 
offering: the impact of mandatory board structure on institutional ownership in the immediate 
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period after the IPO. Prior studies show that board structure, and in particular board 
independence, has a strong influence on institutional ownership (Chung and Zhang, 2011; 
Miletkov et al., 2014). Our setting allows us to examine how board structure, one of the most 
visible dimensions of corporate governance at the time of IPO, influences ownership of 
institutional investors. Since IPO offers the first opportunity for institutional investors to own 
shares in newly listed firms, this study also expands our understanding of the factors that attract 
institutional investors at a time when the concerns of reverse causality are not so relevant. 
Several interesting findings emerge from this study. The examination of board structure 
indicates that the mandatory provision of the regulation is the key determinant of board 
composition as almost all the firms comply with the provisions of the regulations. However, 
even after complying the mandatory regulation, we find that both board size and the board 
composition reflects the advising and monitoring needs of the firm. In other words, our 
evidence suggests that complying with mandatory regulations does not impede firms from 
structuring their boards that is consistent with their scope of operation and the monitoring 
needs. In addition, the results also demonstrate a strong relation between CEO ownership and 
board structure implying that CEO’s influence plays a critical role in the determination of board 
structure at the time of the IPO.  
The investigation on institutional holdings immediately after the IPO reveals, rather 
surprisingly, that for overall institutional investors, neither board size nor the board 
independence significantly influences their holdings in IPO firms. However, when we examine 
institutional holdings separately for domestic and foreign institutional investors, we find a 
positive and strong relationship between board independence and holdings by foreign 
institutional investors. The relation between board structure and domestic institutional holdings 
remains insignificant. Our result suggests that board independence is an important determinant 
of the foreign institutional ownership and that foreign institutional ownership is higher in firms 
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with more independent directors. Since the number of directors is mandated by the regulatory 
provisions, complying with the provision appears to be beneficial for IPOs firms. Further, 
consistent with prior studies, we also find evidence of varying investment preferences of 
domestic and foreign institutional investors.  
The paper makes three important contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the relatively 
sparse literature on the determinants of board structure of IPO firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the issue in a regime where regulation mandates 
the composition of the board of directors. This is also one of the first studies from an emerging 
market which complements the existing evidence from established markets (Baker and 
Gompers, 2003; Suchard, 2009). The second contribution relates to the literature on 
institutional ownership and corporate governance. This is one of the few papers that examine 
the determinants of institutional ownership in the immediate post-IPO period. We extend the 
literature on institutional holdings (see Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Chung and Zhang 
(2011)) by providing evidence on the impact of board structure on institutional ownership at a 
critical time in a firm’s life cycle when concerns for endogeneity for empirical investigations 
are weaker. Third, complementing the findings of Miletkov et al. (2014), we examine the 
relationship between board structure and domestic as well as foreign institutional investors’ 
participation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the relevant 
regulations related to corporate governance in India and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 
presents the data and descriptive statistics. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the main empirical findings. 
Finally, Section 6 provides a brief conclusion of the study.  
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2. Regulations and hypotheses development 
2.1 Regulation on board structure (Clause 49) 
Corporate governance regulations in India have evolved significantly over the last two decades,  
and it took a major step with the promulgation of Clause 49 of the stock exchange listing 
agreement in 2001 [2]. The provisions in Clause 49 are related to corporate governance issues, 
such as composition of board of directors, compensation and disclosures of non-executive 
directors similar to those of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the New York Stock Exchange listing 
rules. While the provisions of the clause were not intended to apply to all publicly listed firms 
at the time of introduction in 2001, they were mandatory for private firms seeking to go public. 
Hence, all our sample IPO firms are subject to the provisions of Clause 49.  
Although the regulations do not prescribe on the size of the board per se, there are clear 
mandatory requirements for board composition. Regulations require that when the chairman of 
the board is a non-executive director, one third of the board members should comprise of 
independent directors and when the chairman of the board is an executive director half of the 
board should comprise of independent directors. However, if the non-executive chairman is a 
promoter of the company or is related to any promoter or person occupying management 
positions, at least one-half of the board of the company should consist of independent directors. 
Thus, while Clause 49 does not require majority of the board members to be independent, it 
nevertheless mandates the number of independent members on the board. More importantly, if 
firms merely follow the mandatory provision, board composition would essentially hinge on 
whether chairman of the board is also the CEO and/or promoter of the firm.    
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Impact of regulation on board structure  
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The beginning of our sample period marks the introduction of Clause 49 of the listing 
agreement which mandates the composition of boards for Indian IPO firms. In the context of 
corporate boards, if regulations are effective in fixing the problem of sub-optimal boards, then 
we should expect a positive relation between firm characteristics and board structure (Linck et 
al., 2008). While the overall purpose of the regulation is to improve governance and ultimately 
firm performance, this may not necessarily be the outcome in a mandated regulatory provision. 
Coles et al. (2008) demonstrate that the optimal board structure is endogenously determined 
based on the characteristics of the firm and argue that mandated provisions may not necessarily 
enhance firm value. Likewise, Wang (2014) shows that the board composed of insiders are as 
effective as board composed of outsiders if CEO is hired from outside of the firm even after 
the mandatory provision of SOX to have a board composed of majority of independent 
directors.   
If the mandatory regulation does not impede firms from achieving optimal boards, then we 
should observe a positive relation between firm characteristics and board structure, i.e. firms 
should find their board structure closely aligned with to their advising and monitoring needs. 
On the other hand, if regulation drives firms away from their optimal board structure, we should 
observe a weak or muted relation between firms’ advising and monitoring needs and its board 
structure.  
   
2.2.2 Board structure and institutional ownership  
Several recent studies demonstrate the relation between various dimensions of corporate 
governance and institutional ownership by both foreign and domestic investors.  Leuz et al. 
(2010) for U.S. institutions and Ferreira and Matos (2008) for global institutions, for instance, 
find a negative relation between large block ownership by insiders and institutional holdings 
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In studies that are related to our paper, both Chung and Zhang (2011) and Bushee et al. (2014) 
robustly document a positive relation between institutional holdings and the quality of 
governance structure.  
Miletkov et al. (2014), in the context of listed firms, show that board structure, and in particular 
board composition, plays a significant role in attracting foreign institutional investors. Thus, 
based on existing literature it can be argued that the characteristics of board structure should 
strongly influence institutional holdings at the time of IPO when no other endogenous market 
based performance measures are available to investors.  
However, mandatory regulations on board structure may force firms to sub-optimally structure 
their boards and therefore reduce the significance of board structure. Further, given the 
constrains of mandatory regulations, firms may cosmetically comply with the regulation by 
hiring socially connected directors, thus reducing the significance of outside directors (Jameson 
et al., 2014). Given that institutional investors are considered to be informed, we may fail to 
find any relationship between institutional holdings and board structure if mandated provisions 
force firms to structure their board either sub-optimally or cosmetically.    
 
3. Data and Sample features 
3.1 Data  
The sample comprises of 377 IPOs issued and listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
and/or the National Stock Exchange (NSE) between 2004 and 2012. Data on boards of 
directors, pre-IPO ownership, and the IPO firm and offer characteristics were hand-collected 
from the IPO prospectus. In the analysis of institutional ownership, we lose 14 IPOs due to 
missing data on institutional ownership. Indian regulations require firms to report their 
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ownership structure on a quarterly basis which includes details of ownership by investor 
categories including promoters and institutional investors. The data on post-IPO institutional 
ownership, stock returns and trading turnover are drawn from Capitaline Database, which is 
the one of the leading capital market databases in India. Appendix A provides the definitions 
of all the variables used in the study. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2 Sample features 
Table 1 (Panel A) presents descriptive statistics of IPO firm characteristics. Only about 18% 
of 377 Indian IPOs are backed by venture capital (VC) at the time of the offering. This is much 
lower than the fraction of VC backed IPO firms in the US (Krishnan et al., 2011) but similar 
to that of Australian IPO firms (Suchard, 2009).  We include venture capital backed IPOs as it 
not only reduces the adverse selection problem but also enhances asset productivity and long 
term firm performance (Escobari et al., 2016). Both total assets and IPO proceeds show a wide 
variation in the size of IPO firms.  While the overall mean total assets (proceeds) is INR 5,066 
(2,295) million, the median IPO firm has total assets (proceeds) of only INR 1,200 (959) 
million.  The average (median) return on asset (ROA for the full year prior to the IPO) is 8.7% 
(7%). The mean (median) continuously compounded annual stock return and stock volatility 
(based on weekly returns) are -0.31 (-0.30) and 0.08 (0.08) respectively.    
Panel B (Table 1) shows descriptive statistics related to board and CEO characteristics. The 
statistics show that average board size of Indian IPOs is 7.57 which is lower than that of listed 
Indian firms (8.02) reported by Jameson et al. (2014). However, it is larger than those reported 
of US (6.07 reported by Baker and Gompers (2003) ) and Australian IPO firms (5.05 reported 
by Suchard (2009)). Figure 1(a) presents the empirical distribution of board size of our sample 
Indian IPO which suggests most boards have around five to 10 directors. The average 
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proportion of outside directors is 47% which is slightly less than the 50.6% of listed Indian 
firms reported by Jameson et al. (2014). The distribution of the fraction of outsiders in the 
board is graphically presented in Figure 1(b).  
The mean CEO ownership is 22% which is higher than that of Australian IPOs (18.53%) 
reported by Suchard (2009). The average age of CEO is 47.81 years with average tenure of 
11.22 years. The tenure of the CEOs in Indian IPO firms is much higher than that of both US 
(7.19 years reported by Baker and Gompers (2003)) and Australian IPO firms (4.78 years 
reported by Suchard (2009)). Further, there are 58 firms (about 15% of the total IPO) with 
CEOs older than 60 years.    
Panel C presents statistics on ownership characteristics. Following Chung and Zhang (2011) 
we measure ownership as the percentage of shares to the total number of shares outstanding. 
The statistics reveal that the pre-IPO holdings of an average promoter (founding owner) is 83% 
which reduces to 58% after IPO. This is slightly higher than the 52.4% of listed Indian firms 
reported by Jameson et al. (2014). Following Chen et al. (2006), we also analyse the top 
promoters’ holdings and find that average top promoter holds 41.35% of equity. Whereas, the 
average institutional ownership immediately after the IPO is 14.09% which drops to 10.09% 
by the end of the first quarter. In general, the institutional ownership remains relatively steady 
during the next 3 quarters within the first year of listing.      
4. The determinants of board structure  
As discussed earlier, if mandatory regulations do not impede firms from attaining an optimal 
board, then we should see a positive relation between board size and composition and the 
advising and monitoring needs of the firm. To examine the determinants, we regress board size 
and board independence against set of explanatory variables using equation (1). Since the 
dependent and independent variables used in our study is at the time of IPO, the variables do 
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not change over time and by firm. Using cross sectional data at the time of IPO reduces the 
potential serial correlation in the error term. Moreover,  since the board structure at the time of 
IPO are predetermined and institutional investors cannot influence the board structure, the 
issues of endogeneity are significantly weaker. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the 
choice of all these variables included in our analysis.    
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒/𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽9𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒
> 60 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 
(1) 
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the board’s role is to provide the CEO with advice and access 
to information and resources, as well as to ratify and monitor senior managers’ decisions. The 
larger and more complex the firm is, the greater will be the firm’s advising needs. Accordingly, 
a number of prior studies suggest that both board size and the size of outsiders is positively 
related to firm size and complexity of operation. Boone et al. (2007) refer to this view as the 
scope of operation hypothesis which suggests that growing firms will seek new members to 
oversee managers’ performance. We use total assets to proxy for firm size and firm age and 
debt to proxy for firm complexity.  
An alternative view of board size and composition involves the analysis of boards’ monitoring 
role. Raheja (2005) argues that as the benefits (costs) of monitoring increase, boards will do 
more (less) monitoring leading to more (less) outsiders and larger (smaller) boards. Thus, 
optimal boards will employ large numbers of outside directors, and be larger in overall size, 
when managers’ private benefits are high and the cost of monitoring is low. Boone et al. (2007) 
consider this as the monitoring hypothesis and we use cash holdings as a proxy for the benefits 
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of monitoring and market to book ratio and CEO ownership to proxy for a firm’s degree of 
information asymmetry. 
A third view of the board looks at the power and characteristics of the CEO. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) argue that CEOs with high power can bargain with outside directors for a 
smaller board with fewer outsiders, or place affiliated outsiders in open board positions. Boone 
et al. (2007) consider this as the negotiation hypothesis and there is considerable prior empirical 
support showing a strong negative relationship between CEO influence and board size and 
composition (Guest, 2008). We use ROA, CEO ownership and CEO tenure as proxy for CEO 
influence. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) also argue that issues relating to succession can 
influence board size and composition, particularly when the CEO is closer to retirement. They 
argue that as a CEO approaches retirement, the firm adds insiders to the board as part of the 
succession process. Baker and Gompers (2003) find that the fraction of inside directors is 
higher when the CEO is over 60 and near retirement. We include CEO age and an indicator 
variable of CEO approaching retirement to proxy for the succession process. Definitions of all 
the variables are available in Appendix A. Appendix B presents the expected signs and the 
source of all the determinants.  
4.1 Board Size 
In this section, we examine the determinants of the board size for our sample of 377 Indian 
IPOs. Since all the firms have complied with the mandatory regulation on board composition 
at the time of IPO, it will be interesting to observe whether complying with mandatory 
provisions impede firms from attaining optimal board size. The result of the OLS regression 
analysis, based on equation (1), is shown in Table 2. The dependent variable in all the 
specifications is the size of the board measured by the number of board members. All 
models/specifications control for industry and year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity adjusted 
robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Specifications (1 – 3) separately show the influence of advising role, monitoring role and CEO 
characteristics on board size; specification (4) combines all the variables together. 
Specification (1) shows that the coefficients of all the variables bear the expected sign, with 
total assets and firm age statistically significant at the less than 5% level. In specification (2) 
CEO ownership is negative and statistically significant and in specification (3), CEO ownership 
is negatively related and CEO Age>60 is positively related (both significant) to the board size. 
In specification (4), we find that total assets, firm age, cash holdings, CEO ownership and CEO 
Age>60 remain statistically significant. Our results indicate that board size is indeed correlated 
with the scope and complexity of firms’ operations. Further, the significant positive coefficient 
of cash holdings suggests that the benefit of monitoring also plays a role in determining the 
size of the board. Overall, this indicates that complying with the mandatory provisions of the 
regulation does not impede firms from structuring an optimal board size.  
The significant negative coefficient of CEO ownership is consistent with both the monitoring 
as well as the CEO influence (negotiation) hypothesis. However, this relationship, in the 
context of Indian IPOs, is possibly a reflection of influence (negotiation) rather than 
monitoring. Baker and Gompers (2003) argue that an IPO is an opportune time to examine the 
negotiation hypothesis as the CEO’s influence comes into play at such times. A large number 
of these Indian IPO firms are run by families who have major controlling stake in the firm at 
the time of the IPO. The power derived from this substantial holding is more likely to be used 
by CEOs to influence board membership. Given that CEOs own a significant fraction of the 
firm’s equity, the negative relation between board size and CEO ownership is also consistent 
with Linck et al. (2008) ownership incentives hypothesis. Finally, the positive coefficient of 
CEO >60 is not surprising as board membership may be a part of the process of grooming 
future CEOs as argued by Baker and Gompers (2003). 
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4.2 Board independence 
Next we examine the determinants of board independence of Indian IPO firms where minimum 
proportion of outside directors is prescribed by the regulation. Appendix A present the 
definitions of all the variables and Appendix B presents the source as well as expected sign of 
all the determinant variables. The results are reported in Table 3. All regression models include 
industry and year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
The dependent variable in all the specifications is the number of outsiders in the board. We use 
number of independent directors (outsiders), rather than percentage of independent directors 
because a large proportion of the IPO firms have exactly 50 per cent as outsiders in the board 
causing only a limited variation in the values of the dependent variable. Specification (1) 
includes proxies for advising roles, specification (2) includes proxies for monitoring roles, 
specification (3) includes only CEO characteristics, both firm and CEO characteristics are 
included in specification (4). 
The results are similar to those reported for board size. Specification (1) shows that the number 
of outsiders is positively and significantly related to total assets; specification (2) shows that 
CEO ownership is negatively and cash holdings is positively related to the number of outsiders 
on the board. In specification (3), we find that CEO ownership is negatively related and CEO 
Age>60 is positively related to outsider size. In specification (4), we find that total assets, cash 
holdings, CEO ownership and CEO age>60 remain statistically significant and are the major 
determinants of board independence.  
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Our results are in line with those reported in previous studies (for example, Boone et al. (2007)) 
and indicate that outsider size is also correlated with the scope and complexity of firms’ 
operation. The significant and positive relation between firms’ cash holdings and board 
independence provide support for monitoring hypothesis. The significant and negative 
relationship between CEO ownership and board independence provide support for both 
monitoring and CEO influence (negotiation) hypothesis. Given most of the firms are family 
owned and controlled at the time of IPO; CEO may have substantial influence on appointment 
of independent board of directors. Hence, this relationship between CEO ownership and 
outsider size is possibly a reflection of influence (negotiation hypothesis) rather than 
monitoring. The relationship is also consistent with ownership incentives hypothesis of (Linck 
et al., 2008) who suggest that independence is decreasing with insider incentive alignment. 
Overall, our results suggest that Indian IPO firms are able to avoid sub-optimal board structure 
despite complying with the mandatory regulation on board composition.  
 
5. The board structure and institutional share ownership 
As the future performance of the firm is likely to depend on the quality of its governance, the 
investment and shareholding decisions of investors is likely to be guided by the 
composition/quality of the board. This section examines the implications of the information 
contained on the composition of the Indian IPO firms’ board on the ownership of institutional 
investors at the time of IPOs as well as in four quarters immediately after the completion of 
IPO. 
5.1 Overall Institutional Share ownership  
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To examine the role of board structure of IPO firms on institutional ownership, we consider 
several variables that have been associated with institutional holdings as shown in equation (2). 
As in equation (1), the dependent used in our study is at each quarter after IPO and the 
independent variables is at the time of IPO, the variables do not change over time and by firm. 
Due to cross-sectional nature of data, there are no potential serial correlational in the error term 
and the issue of endogeneity are significantly weaker in this setting. 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
′𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽6𝑉𝐶 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
+ 𝛽12𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽15𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 
(2) 
The main variables of concern for this analysis are related to board structure – namely board 
independence and the size of the board [3]. As an additional aspect of the board structure, we 
also include a dummy variable representing the CEO duality. Following Ferreira and Matos 
(2008) and Chung and Zhang (2011) we include a number of control variables that have been 
associated with institutional ownership. Accordingly, to control for insiders’ ownership 
characteristics the fraction of shares owned by top promoter (Chen et al., 2006) and the fraction 
of shares held by promoters in the post-IPO period (Ferreira and Matos, 2008) are included [4]. 
A dummy variable representing the VC backed IPOs, market capitalization of the firm, book-
to-market ratio, firm’s age, ROA, cash holdings, debt ratio, stock return stock volatility [5] and 
trading turnover are also included as control variables. The definition of all these variables is 
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presented in Appendix A, while the source and the expected sign of the variables are shown in 
Appendix C.  
The results of OLS regression analysis are presented in Table 4 where the dependent variable, 
institutional holdings, is defined as the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors 
relative to the total outstanding shares of the IPO firm. All specifications control for industry 
and year fixed effects and the reported t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Specification (1) examines institutional ownership at the end of the first quarter, specification 
(2) at the end of the second quarter and specification (3) at the end of the fourth quarter. Since 
prior studies suggest that investors flip their IPO allocation in the post-listing period (Ellis, 
2006), we extend the time frame to the first year of listing. Further, by limiting the analysis to 
only the first year of listing helps us to avoid concerns of reverse causality as discussed in 
Chung and Zhang (2011).   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Surprisingly, the results in all three specifications show that neither board independence nor 
board size appear to influence institutional holdings. Overall, the result is not only inconsistent 
with some recent studies (Bushee et al., 2014; Miletkov et al., 2014), it also suggests that 
institutional investors do not consider board composition as a relevant firm level measure of 
corporate governance in the context of Indian firms. In the next section, we will examine 
institutional holdings by foreign and domestic investors to see if the result holds for both the 
categories of institutional investors.     
Among the variables representing insiders’ ownership, consistent with the findings of Ferreira 
and Matos (2008), the estimates reveal significant negative relationship between post IPO 
promoters’ holding and institutional ownership. Since post IPO promoter’s holding reflects the 
fraction of shares held by insiders, it is apparent that institutional investors invest less in firms 
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with large insider holdings. The role of other control variables is also consistent with the 
findings reported in prior studies. The evidence shows that the institutional investors generally 
prefer and invest more on larger firms, those backed by venture capitalists, higher firm’s cash 
holding and stock return. However, the institutional shareholding is found to be inversely 
related to stock volatility. The estimates also suggest an inverse relation between trading 
turnover and institutional ownership [6]. A closer inspection shows that this relationship is 
driven by the fact that trading turnover is substantially higher in smaller firms in the immediate 
post-listing period. This negative relationship, however, becomes generally weaker and 
economically less meaningful over time. Conversely, the relationship between institutional 
ownership and stock return/volatility becomes stronger over time.  
5.2 Foreign and domestic institutional investors 
In this section, we examine whether the composition of board structure has differing impact on 
the holdings of domestic and foreign institutional investors. Several prior studies show that the 
investment preferences of foreign and domestic institutional investors vary significantly 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Chung and Zhang, 2011). Prior studies also suggest that while 
domestic institutional investors have informational advantage in their home markets, foreign 
institutional investors are more likely to have superior investment experience and expertise.   
The results of OLS regression (based on equation (2)) is presented in Table 5 where the 
dependent variable in specification (1 – 3) is the fraction of shares owned by domestic 
institutional and the dependent variable in specification (4 – 6) is fraction of shares owned by 
foreign institutional in first quarter, second quarter and fourth quarter respectively.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
While all the three aspects of board composition remain insignificant for domestic institutional 
investors, we find that the coefficient on board independence is positive and statistically 
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significant for holdings by foreign institutional investors. We also find that the economic and 
statistical significance of board independence on foreign institutional holdings increases over 
time. This finding on the investment behaviour of foreign institutional investors is consistent 
with Miletkov et al. (2014), who find that board independence is an important determinant of 
the level of foreign institutional ownership and that foreign institutional ownership is higher in 
firms with more independent directors. The result also suggests that as domestic institutional 
investors may have other avenues of information, on account of their information advantage, 
they do not rely on the information contained on the board composition in making their 
investment decisions. On the other hand, the publicly available information on board 
composition represents one of the few anchors that foreign institutional investors have in 
making their investment decisions.  
The estimates on various control variables reveal that while the ownership of domestic as well 
as foreign institutional investors is negatively related to the post-IPO promoters’ holdings, the 
economic significance of this variable is higher for foreign institutional than domestic 
institutional investors. Likewise, we also find that foreign investors have a stronger preference 
for larger firms than domestic investors. Domestic investors show a strong preference for firms 
with large cash holdings, while foreign institutional investors appear to be attracted to firms 
with high recent stock returns. Both foreign and domestic institutional investors appear to avoid 
firms with high price volatility.   
6. Conclusions 
Using a unique hand-collected data set of Indian IPOs issued during the 2004-2012 period, this 
paper examines the influence of mandatory provisions on board structure as well as the impact 
of such board structure on institutional holdings in the immediate post-IPO period. The sample 
period represents an important era of corporate governance reforms in India with the 
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introduction of a number of mandatory provisions, including the composition of the board of 
directors for firms seeking to go public. In this background, the paper empirically analyses the 
determinants of board size and board independence at the time of the IPOs. Further, the 
influence of such a board structure on shareholdings by institutional investors is also 
extensively analyzed. 
Our results show that while almost all the firms follow the mandatory provisions on board 
structure, complying with the provisions does not impede firms from structuring their boards 
that reflect the firms’ advising and monitoring needs. Board size and size of outsiders bear a 
positive relationship with total assets and cash holdings of the IPO firm consistent with the 
suggestion that board size as well as board independence is a reflection of the firm’s advising 
and monitoring needs. We further find that CEO influence is a major determinant of board size 
and board composition for Indian firms at the time of the IPO as we find strong negative 
relationship between CEO ownership and board size/outsider size. An extensive analysis of 
institutional ownership immediately after the IPO demonstrates a lack of significant relation 
between board structure and shareholdings of the overall institutional investors. However, 
when we examine the holdings separately for domestic and foreign investors, we find a positive 
and strong relation between board independence and the holdings by foreign institutional 
investors. Our result suggests that board independence is an important determinant of the 
foreign institutional ownership and that foreign institutional ownership is higher in firms with 
more independent directors.  
 
 
Notes:
1 We discuss this regulation in some detail in section 2.  
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2 Chakrabarti et al. (2008) provide a detailed description of the evolution of corporate 
governance in India. 
3 For robustness, we ran all the analyses using the number of outsiders on the board. Results 
are qualitatively similar and can be provided upon request.   
4 Since promoters have a lock-in period of 3 years, we use the promoters’ holdings immediately 
after IPO as post IPO promoters’ holding in all our analyses.   
5 Our results are qualitatively similar when we use the first three month stock return and stock 
volatility measures.  
6 We also re-run all the specifications by using annual figures and our results are qualitatively 
similar.    
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Appendix A 
Description of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
IPO Firm/Offer Characteristics 
VC Backed IPO firms that are backed by a venture capitalists. 
Total Assets Book value of total assets (log value is used in 
regressions).  
Proceeds Offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered. 
Market Capitalization Total market capitalization of the firm at offer price (log 
value is used in regressions). 
Firm Age  Difference between a firm’s IPO year and the founding 
year (log of 1 plus the firm’s age is used in regressions). 
Cash Percentage of cash holdings to total sales.  
Market-to-Book Ratio of book value of total debt plus market value of 
equity (calculated at offer price) divided by total assets at 
the time of IPO. Book-to-market is the inverse of market-
to-book.  
Debt Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
ROA Return on total assets for the full year prior to the year of 
the IPO. 
Stock Return Continuously compounded annual return based on 
monthly returns. For first, second and fourth quarter 
institutional ownership regressions, we use the first three 
months, six months and twelve months monthly returns 
respectively. We exclude first day return.  
Stock Volatility Standard deviation of weekly returns.  For first, second 
and fourth quarter institutional ownership regressions, 
we use the standard deviation of weekly returns for first 
three, six and twelve months respectively. We exclude 
the first day return. 
Trading Turnover Ratio of total number of shares traded to total shares 
outstanding. For first, second and fourth quarter 
institutional ownership regressions, we use the three 
month, six month and one year trading volume 
respectively. We exclude the trading volume on the first 
day of listing  
Board and CEO Characteristics   
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Board Size Number of people on the board. 
Outsider Size Number of independent directors on the board. 
Board Independence Number of independent directors divided by total number 
of board members. 
Duality A dummy variable which equals 1 if COE and chairman 
positions is the same person and 0 otherwise.   
CEO Ownership Percentage of shares held by the CEO. 
CEO Age  Age of the CEO (in years). 
CEO Tenure Tenure of the CEO (in years). 
CEO Age>60 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the age of 
the CEO is greater than 60, and 0 otherwise. 
Ownership Characteristics 
Post-IPO Promoters' holding Percentage of shares held by promoters (founders) post 
IPO to the total number of shares outstanding. 
Top Promoter Percentage of shares held by the top promoter. 
Institutional Ownership Percentage of shares held by institutional investors to the 
total outstanding shares. Data are collected for three 
points: at the end of first, second and third quarter during 
the first post-IPO year.  
Domestic Institutional  
Investors’ Ownership 
Percentage of shares held by domestic institutional 
investors to the total outstanding shares. Data are 
collected for three points: at the end of first, second and 
third quarter during the first post-IPO year  
Foreign Institutional  
Investors’ Ownership 
Percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors to the total outstanding shares. Data are 
collected for three points: at the end of first, second and 
third quarter during the first post-IPO year  
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Appendix B 
Board Structure Variables: Expected Sign and Source 
Variables 
Expected Sign 
Source  Board 
Size 
Board 
Independence 
 
Total Assets + +  Baker and Gompers (2003); Boone et 
al. (2007); Guest (2008)  
Firm Age + +  Baker and Gompers (2003);Boone et 
al. (2007);Guest (2008)   
Debt + +  Guest (2008) 
Cash + +  Baker and Gompers (2003); Boone et 
al. (2007); Guest (2008) 
Market-to-Book - -  Boone et al. (2007); Linck et al. 
(2008) 
ROA - -  Guest (2008); Linck et al. (2008) 
     
CEO Ownership - -  Boone et al. (2007); Linck et al. 
(2008) 
CEO Tenure - -  Baker and Gompers (2003); Boone et 
al. (2007) Linck et al. (2008) 
CEO Age - -  Baker and Gompers (2003); Linck et 
al. (2008) 
CEO Age>60 + +  Baker and Gompers (2003); Linck et 
al. (2008) 
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Appendix C 
Institutional Ownership Variables: Expected Sign and Source 
 
 
 
 
Variables Expected 
Sign 
Source  
Board Size + Coles et al. (2008); Bushee et al. (2014); Jameson et 
al. (2014) 
   
Board independence + Coles et al. (2008); Bushee et al. (2014); Jameson et 
al. (2014) 
Dual - Bushee et al. (2014) 
   
Top Promoter - Chen et al. (2006); Ferreira and Matos (2008);  
   
Post-IPO Promoters’ 
Holding 
- Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
   
VC Backed + Field and Lowry (2009)  
   
Market Capitalization + Bushee et al. (2014); Ferreira and Matos (2008); 
Chung and Zhang (2011) 
   
Book-to-Market + Ferreira and Matos (2008); Bushee et al. (2014) 
 
Firm Age + Field and Lowry (2009); Chung and Zhang (2011) 
 
ROA + Ferreira and Matos (2008); Chung and Zhang 
(2011) 
   
Cash  + Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
   
Debt + Chung and Zhang (2011) 
   
Stock Return + Ferreira and Matos (2008); Chung and Zhang 
(2011) 
   
Stock Volatility - Bushee et al. (2014) 
   
Trading Turnover + Ferreira and Matos (2008); Chung and Zhang 
(2011); Bushee et al. (2014) 
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Figure 1(a): Distribution of board size 
 
 
 Figure 1(b): Distribution of the fraction of independent directors 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
The table reports the descriptive statistics of Indian IPO characteristics and board characteristics. The sample includes 
IPOs listed on the BSE and NSE from January 2004 to December 2012. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Variables Mean Median 
25th 
Pctl 
75 Pctl 
Std 
dev 
Max Min 
Number of IPOs 377       
Number of VC Backed IPOs                     68      
Panel A: Firm Characteristics      
Total Assets (INR mill) 5,066 1,200 561 3,858 12,949 154,856 70 
Proceeds (INR mill) 2,295 959 432 1,710 6,025 91,875 60 
Market Capitalization (INR mill) 18,389 2,946 1,270 9,570 75,914 895,037 166 
Firm Age 14.21 12.03 8.04 16.70 10.52 92.06 0.67 
Cash 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.16 2.69 0.00 
Book-to-Market  0.67 0.46 0.28 0.74 1.19 20.16 0.01 
Debt 0.57 0.61 0.45 0.73 0.22 1.18 0.00 
ROA 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.14 1.60 -0.65 
        
Market Return 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.29 -0.23 
Market Volatility 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 
Stock Return -0.31 -0.30 -0.77 0.22 0.79 2.12 -2.47 
Stock Volatility 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.03 
Trading Turnover 10.13 2.77 1.22 6.29 42.01 334.2 0.05 
        
        
Panel B: Board and CEO Characteristics 
Board Size 7.57 7.00 6.00 9.00 2.30 19.00 3.00 
Fraction of Outsiders  0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.14 0.86 0.23 
# of Firms with Duality 196       
CEO Ownership 0.22 0.15 0.02 0.31 0.24 1.00 0.00 
CEO Age (Years) 47.81 47.00 40.00 54.00 10.37 79.00 21.00 
CEO Tenure 11.22 10.63 5.15 15.59 7.62 39.59 0.29 
CEO Age>60 58       
        
Panel C: Ownership Characteristics (%)       
Pre-IPO Promoters' Holding 83.05 89.14 69.86 100.00 19.36 100.00 23.55 
Post-IPO Promoters' Holding 58.62 59.22 49.38 69.09 15.73 90.04 20.25 
Top Promoter 41.35 36.24 23.39 55.75 23.37 100.00 4.10 
Institutional Ownership – IPO  14.09 12.87 7.07 19.13 9.64 55.21 0.00 
Institutional Ownership – Qtr 1 10.09 8.72 2.72 15.00 9.19 49.80 0.00 
Institutional Ownership – Qtr 2 10.25 8.69 1.58 14.78 9.66 49.52 0.00 
Institutional Ownership – Qtr 3 10.32 8.82 1.84 15.62 10.03 52.25 0.00 
Institutional Ownership – Qtr 4 10.31 8.67 1.36 15.90 10.17 52.07 0.00 
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Table 2: The Determinants of Board Size 
 
 Advising 
(1) 
Monitoring 
(2) 
CEO 
(3) 
All 
(4) 
Total Assets 0.622***   0.519*** 
 (6.04)   (5.30) 
     
Firm Age 0.107**   0.084* 
 (2.01)   (1.87) 
     
Debt -0.099   -0.077 
 (-0.14)   (-0.11) 
     
Cash holdings  0.443**  0.301** 
  (2.13)  (2.02) 
     
Market-to-Book  -0.006  -0.075 
  (-0.05)  (-0.54) 
     
CEO Ownership  -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.017*** 
  (-5.73) (-5.85) (-3.99) 
     
ROA   0.010 0.090 
   (0.01) (0.08) 
     
CEO Tenure   -0.179 -0.125 
   (-1.26) (-0.92) 
     
CEO Age   -0.001 -0.012 
   (-0.07) (-0.85) 
     
CEO Age>60   1.080** 0.990** 
   (2.12) (2.03) 
     
Industry & Year Dummies Yes  Yes Yes 
     
Constant 1.522* 6.889*** 6.951*** 3.608*** 
 (1.94) (16.21) (9.03) (3.63) 
Observations 377 377 377 377 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.095 0.109 0.236 
This Table shows the OLS regression results of the determinants of board size. The dependent variable in all 
the specifications is size of the board. The sample includes IPOs listed on the BSE and NSE from January 
2004 to December 2012. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics are in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3: The Determinants of Board Independence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Table shows the OLS regression results for the determinants of board independence. The dependent variable 
in all the specifications is the number of outsiders on the board. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 Advising 
(1) 
Monitoring 
(2) 
CEO 
(3) 
All 
(4) 
Total Assets 0.271***   0.239*** 
 (4.36)   (3.72) 
     
Firm Age 0.100*   0.082 
 (1.76)   (0.57) 
     
Debt -0.330   -0.325 
 (-0.88)   (-0.77) 
     
Cash holdings  0.219*  0.392*** 
  (1.79)  (2.68) 
     
Market-to-Book  0.042  0.042 
  (0.62)  (0.55) 
     
CEO Ownership  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006** 
  (-3.29) (-3.43) (-2.26) 
     
ROA   0.415 0.440 
   (0.72) (0.76) 
     
CEO Tenure   -0.078 -0.073 
   (-0.82) (-0.75) 
     
CEO Age   -0.007 -0.013 
   (-0.65) (-1.30) 
     
CEO Age>60   0.625* 0.603* 
   (1.89) (1.83) 
     
Industry & Year Dummies Yes  Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.627 2.822*** 3.066*** 1.613* 
 (0.87) (5.46) (4.46) (1.87) 
Observations 377 377 377 377 
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.058 0.061 0.098 
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Table 4: Board Structure & Institutional Holdings - OLS Regressions 
 
 Qtr 1 
(1) 
Qtr 2 
(3) 
Qtr 4 
(3) 
Board Independence 1.476 0.882 2.690 
 (0.27) (0.16) (0.46) 
    
Board Size 0.021 -0.092 -0.164 
 (0.09) (-0.38) (-0.69) 
    
Dual -0.696 0.009 -0.568 
 (-0.76) (0.01) (-0.62) 
    
Top Promoter -0.014 -0.011 -0.010 
 (-0.79) (-0.62) (-0.52) 
    
Post-IPO Promoters’ Holding -13.562*** -15.035*** -13.390*** 
 (-4.09) (-4.14) (-3.66) 
    
VC Backed 1.967 3.093* 2.572 
 (1.24) (1.92) (1.59) 
    
Market Capitalization 2.456*** 2.324*** 1.833*** 
 (5.41) (4.96) (3.78) 
    
Book-to-Market -0.531 -0.482 -0.862 
 (-0.75) (-0.64) (-1.03) 
    
Firm Age 0.330 0.311 0.514 
 (0.41) (0.38) (0.63) 
    
ROA -2.889 -2.105 -2.237 
 (-1.10) (-0.76) (-0.67) 
    
Cash  8.839*** 9.946*** 9.688*** 
 (5.99) (4.71) (4.31) 
    
Debt -1.971 -2.209 -3.237 
 (-0.72) (-0.81) (-1.18) 
    
Stock Return 0.159 0.829** 3.098*** 
 (0.74) (2.23) (4.77) 
    
Stock Volatility -15.530 -42.293** -77.482*** 
 (-1.17) (-2.46) (-3.05) 
    
Trading Turnover -1.402*** -0.012** -0.009 
 (-3.80) (-2.36) (-1.47) 
    
Industry & Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant -4.320 -0.223 4.300 
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 (-0.79) (-0.04) (0.73) 
Observations 345 345 345 
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.329 0.352 
 
This Table reports the OLS regression results of the influence of board structure on institutional holdings 
in IPOs. The dependent variable in specifications (1), (2), and (3) is institutional ownership at the end of 
the first, second and fourth quarter respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
33 
 
Table 5: Board Structure – Foreign and Domestic Institutional Investors 
 
 
 
Dom Qtr 1 
(1) 
Dom Qtr 2 
(2) 
Dom Qtr 3 
(3) 
For Qtr 1 
(4) 
For Qtr 2 
(5) 
For Qtr 3 
(6) 
Board Independence -5.305 -5.515 -3.705 5.523** 6.487** 6.870** 
 (-1.21) (-1.03) (-0.89) (2.34) (2.51) (2.54) 
       
Board Size 0.076 0.074 0.048 -0.028 -0.144 -0.170 
 (0.55) (0.52) (0.35) (-0.16) (-0.79) (-0.93) 
       
Dual 0.399 0.619 0.597 -0.790 -0.457 -1.000 
 (0.72) (1.13) (1.13) (-1.25) (-0.70) (-1.46) 
       
Top Promoter -0.015 -0.011 -0.010 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (-1.28) (-0.97) (-0.85) (0.09) (0.03) (0.15) 
       
Post-IPO Promoters’ Holding -4.459** -5.004** -4.679** -8.564*** -9.132*** -9.014*** 
 (-2.18) (-2.39) (-2.29) (-3.16) (-2.99) (-3.14) 
       
VC Backed 0.670 0.543 0.627 1.117 2.224* 1.942 
 (0.71) (0.57) (0.68) (0.93) (1.74) (1.53) 
       
Market Capitalization 0.482 0.492* 0.439 1.692*** 1.604*** 1.372*** 
 (1.63) (1.68) (1.52) (4.94) (4.46) (3.96) 
       
Book-to-Market -0.175 -0.115 -0.119 -0.344 -0.318 -0.633 
 (-0.41) (-0.27) (-0.31) (-0.66) (-0.59) (-0.98) 
       
Firm Age 0.346 0.514 0.761 0.125 -0.087 -0.147 
 (0.72) (1.04) (1.51) (0.21) (-0.13) (-0.23) 
       
ROA 0.677 0.786 -0.187 -3.423 -2.937 -1.911 
 (0.59) (0.65) (-0.13) (-1.51) (-1.14) (-0.63) 
       
Cash 10.065*** 11.912*** 12.345*** 1.880 2.600* 2.715* 
 (3.61) (3.83) (3.64) (1.05) (1.75) (1.78) 
       
Debt -1.092 -1.700 -2.036 -1.428 -1.234 -1.227 
 (-0.76) (-1.16) (-1.38) (-0.72) (-0.62) (-0.59) 
       
Stock Return 0.505 0.455 0.782 0.566* 1.364*** 2.196*** 
 (1.36) (1.22) (1.18) (1.81) (3.36) (4.65) 
       
Stock Volatility -34.452** -42.492*** -48.613*** -11.042 -36.042** -29.173* 
 (-2.32) (-2.95) (-3.67) (-0.65) (-2.16) (-1.67) 
       
Trading Turnover -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.006** -0.005** -0.003 -0.003 
 (-4.37) (-3.69) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-0.46) (-0.41) 
       
Industry & Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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This Table reports the OLS regression results of the influence of board structure on domestic and foreign 
institutional holdings in IPOs. The dependent variable in specifications (1), (2) and (3) is domestic 
institutional ownership at the end of the first, second and fourth quarter respectively. The dependent variable 
in specifications (4), (5) and (6) is foreign institutional ownership at the end of the first, second and fourth 
quarter respectively. For a definition of variables see Appendix A. White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Constant 7.710** 7.490** 7.338** -7.162** -3.949 -2.388 
 (2.09) (2.04) (2.02) (-2.11) (-1.15) (-0.65) 
Observations 345 345 345 360 360 360 
Adjusted R2 0.230 0.265 0.277 0.196 0.274 0.272 
